Germany and the United States are generally seen as the two competing systems of corporate governance. In search for a comparative welfare analysis of the financial systems, we are interested in (i) the aggregate value-added of corporate investments in the two countries and in (ii) the interaction of investment and financing decisions. This paper investigates the impact of financing, investment, and dividend decisions on the value of stock corporations in Germany and the US. The methodology is based on a cross-sectional approach proposed by Fama and French. In general, the evidence shows that relations for the German firms are statistically similar to those found for their US counterparts. In both countries, corporate investment creates value in excess of cost, but the US industrial sector seems to be more efficient in making value-enhancing investments. Robust statistical methods are applied to verify the results. They do not change the main conclusions.
4 dividends, investments, and the market value added of firms. One exception is the study by Kaplan (1994) which finds that poor stock performance and negative earnings increase the likelihood of management turnover in Germany. He interprets this as evidence that the German corporate governance system does not ignore short-term performance because it penalizes bad managers in a similar way the US financial system does. Thus, he concludes that the two systems are not all that different.
However, he focuses merely on executive turnover, and his results are likely to be driven by the obvious correlation between bad earnings and negative stock market reactions which exists regardless of the financial system.
In an attempt to fill the gap of papers comparing the welfare effects of different financial systems, this study investigates finance and investment patterns in Germany and the US. It is organized as follows: Section 1 formulates the hypotheses. Section 2 describes the data and the selection of the final sample. Section 3 explains the FamaFrench cross-section regression approach to measuring the relations between value and financing decisions. Summary statistics in Section 4 examine the means and the correlations of the regression variables. The regression results are in Section 5. Robust statistical regression results are presented in Section 6. Section 7 links the empirical evidence to the theory, and Section 8 concludes the paper.
Investment Decisions, Financing Decisions, and Firm Value in Germany and the

US
In a recent article, Fama and French (1998) provide a new approach to explain how investment and financing decisions affect firm value. 10 In order to present evidence on the value added from investment decisions, they use year-by-year Fama-MacBeth (FM, 1973) regressions to explain differences across US companies in the spread of value over cost, V t -A t (market value minus book value of a firm's total assets), and the biannual change in this spread. Their approach provides a good tool to investigate if substantial cross-national differences in the interaction of investment and financing patterns exist. I also allows to address to the following questions:
(i) Do companies in the German financial system perform better or worse than their
American counterparts in making value-enhancing investments?
(
ii) Are different dominant financing and dividend strategies in different countries eminent?
Although these questions appear to be very ambitious, obtaining partial results are certainly worth making the effort for. In short, with some exceptions, most of the findings are rather similar to those found by Fama and French (FF, 1998) .
The aim of this paper to compare my results for German firms with those of FF for US ones requires that the methodology employed follows FF,as far as it is possible and meaningful. Some more sophisticated regression techniques are applied to test the robustness of my results. The paper concentrates on distinct characteristics and differences between the American and German data sets and, most importantly, on the interpretation of these results.
Data Description and Sample Selection
The original sample is divided into two time periods (1967-84 and 1985-91) because the German Accounting Directives Law changed in 1985. Results from a previous study covering the time period 1985-91 are partially reported.
6
The Data for this project, covering the period 1967-84, were mainly taken from a database that was formerly used by Gehrke (1994) . 11 It contains financial accounting data from unconsolidated statements (Einzelabschlüsse) and stock market data on 90% of all industrial stock corporations that were publicly listed in Germany from 1967 to 1984. Market values of equity for the German companies were obtained from the Hoppenstedt Stock Guide (Börsenführer). The financial accounting data for the previous project covering the subsequent time period from 1985 to 1991 were obtained from COMPUSTAT Global Vantage Industrial/Commercial (I/C) File, an international database, which reports figures from consolidated statements (Konzernabschlüsse). French (1996 and 1998) , in their study use data on US-GAAP consolidated staments from the time period 1965 to 1992 (28 Years) provided by the COMPUSTAT Industrial Database. Surprising or not, for the German data it finally comes out that the choice between consolidated or unconsolidated statements does not at all change the results of the regression analysis.
To be included in the cross-section regressions for year t, a firm must have data available on all variables for the three consecutive years t to t+2. Under this requirement, the sample size for the level regressions ranges from 124 (in 1967) to 479 companies (in 1968), on average 400 firms each year. In the previous study, the sample size for the level regressions ranges from 82 (in 1985) to 134 companies (in 1991), on average 100 firms each year. Although seemingly small compared to the 1883 firms (1967) and firms 4180 (1991) in the FF sample, the number of 7200 observations in 1967-84 is reasonably good, given that there are far less stock listed companies in Germany and that German disclosure requirements and the data availability of annual reports for empirical research in finance are much better in the US. Particularly
American researchers therefore tend to argue that the results of such comparative tests are somehow being driven by accounting differences in US and German GAAP.
However, Harris, Lang, and Möller (1993) come to the conclusion that accounting data for German corporations "are significantly associated with stock price levels and 7 returns". They find that the explanatory power is at least comparable to that in the United States. 12 This will be verified by the following study.
Cross-Sectional Regression Methodology
Event studies are the most popular empirical method from which to draw inferences about the effects of investment and financing decisions. 13 As FF point out, however, event studies face problems that cross-section regressions can overcome: "[B]ecause the regressions examine the cumulative effects of longer-term (two-year) changes in financing decisions, the observed value effects are larger and more reliable than those of event studies. Moreover, because the regressions control for earnings, dividends, debt, and investment, they better expose the richness of the information about value in investment and financing decisions."
Fama-Macbeth regressions involve a series of year-by-year cross-sectional least squares (LS) regressions of the spread of value over cost on one or more explanatory variables that are assumed to be driving factors of investment and financing decisions.
The general form of the FM regressions is:
where T is the number of years, R t is the number of firms ("records") in year t, (V j,t -A j,t )/A j,t is the spread of value over cost of firm j in year t (scaled by the book value of total assets A j,t ), F is the number of explanatory variables, X i,j,t is the realization of explanatory factor i for firm j in year t. The predictions tested are,
i.e., the null hypothesis states that the time-series average of the year-by-year regression slopes is 0. The statistical significance is conducted by a one-sample t-test that assumes normality and identical independent distribution (i.i.d.) of the regression slopes. The time-series means of the slope coefficients are divided by their standard errors and then multiplied by the square root of the number of observations (T -1):
Following from the central limit theorem, this t-statistic is approximately robust with respect to deviations from normality, depending on the sample size and possible outliers in the data.
14 Fama (1978) claims that the common goal of investment and financing decisions is to maximize the difference between total firm value and cost. Based on this assumption, firm value is best defined as V t -A t , the spread of total market value over the replacement cost of the assets, the assets being necessary to generate that market value. Since replacement cost is hard to calculate, it is proxied by the book value of total assets. The market value of debt is proxied by book value of total liabilities, information that can be obtained from financial statement data items. In order to allow comparisons across firms without overemphasizing the effect of very large firms, the firm value is scaled by the book value of total assets, A t . The scaling should also weaken biases introduced by heteroscedasticity. Finally, using relative rather than absolute values allows us to ignore inflation influences.
To examine the effects of investment and financing decisions on firm value in Knez and Ready (1997) or Casella and Berger (1990, pp. 216-220) for a detailed discussion of the central limit theorem. To be included in these regressions for fiscal year t, a firm must provide data on all the relevant variables for five consecutive years until the year t+4. This data requirement is more restrictive than in regressions (1) and (2) which only required observations on three consecutive years. Thus, the sample size is smaller in regressions (3) and (4). 
Summary Statistics
Correlations of the Regression Variables
The Level of the Dependent and Independent Variables
Do the effects of a firm's value on investment and financing decisions differ for different types of firms in Germany and the US? Table 2 shows the means of the dependent and independent variables for the German sample, with the firms sorted by size into two groups and by book-to-market-equity (BE/ME) into another two groups.
Since no CRSP tapes nor BE/ME breakdown values by size are available for German stock companies, the firms are simply divided according to their own reported figures into groups of equal size each year. Nevertheless, even this simple sorting procedure results in clear patterns. For the cross-country comparisons, the data are averaged from the FF sample across the same 18 sample years (t=1967-84).
Are investment decisions more effective in the US than in Germany? The simple average of (V t -A t )/A t is 0.501 for US firms, compared to 0.460 for German firms. On the other hand, the simple regressions reveal that a $1 increase in assets between t and t+2 adds between $.57 and $.77 to the spread of value over cost in the US, between 1967 and 1984 (not reported), whereas a DM 1.00 biannual increase in assets seems to add only DM 0.43 to (V t -A t )/A t . A first guess leads to the conclusion that investment drives value in the US, whereas value quite possibly drives investment in Germany. The average growth rate of assets dA t /A t -our proxy for corporate investment --is also much higher in the US (0.340) than in Germany (0.158), but in both countries investment rates are higher for low-BE/ME than for high-BE/ME firms.
The average level of earnings (reported before interest and after taxes) E t /A t for all size-BE/ME groups in Germany (All=0.042) is drastically lower than the corresponding level in the US (0.077), which may be attributed to the assumed conservatism in German accounting. It also supports HLM (1994) Dividends show other patterns. Overall, the ratio of dividends to assets D t /A t does not differ much between Germany (0.018) and the US (0.017). 20 In both countries, low-BE/ME firms pay much more dividends than do high-BE/ME firms. As in the US, big German firms pay on average more dividends than do small firms, so that large low-BE/ME firms pay out the highest dividends relative to their assets in both countries. All German firms experience modest growth in dividends dD t /A t (0.002) compared to their US counterparts (0.004).
Contrary to the conventional view that debt is the dominant source of financing in Germany, the firms in our sample are even slightly less levered than their American counterparts, when the ratio of interest expense to assets I t /A t is used as the relevant measure (0.021 vs. 0.022). This evidence is supported by Rajan and Zingales (1995) who -by using different adjusted measures of leverage --find that across the G-7
countries German firms are relatively less levered. 21 However, given that German firms finance themselves more through directly placed bank loans and much less 19 The corresponding average earnings before taxes for the US sample are ET t /A t = .121 (+57% compared to earnings after taxes) and dET t /A t =.040 (+48%). 20 The slightly higher dividend payout ratio in Germany could be attributed to the fact that there is no double taxation of dividends like in the US. 21 Their basic measure is the ratio of total debt to capital (debt + equity). However, they also adjust for cash balances, pension liabilities, deferred taxes, goodwill, intangibles, and provisions. Even after these adjustments, the German median ratio of debt to capital remains the lowest of all G-7 countries.
through marketable securities (Allen/Gale, 1995) , an explanation of the lower I t /A t could be that these bank loans provide better conditions, i.e., on average lower interest rates due to the benefits of financial intermediation and closer relationships between banks and firms in Germany. However, in a study on the structure of the German banking system, Edwards and Fischer (1994) find no evidence of lower cost of banksupplied debt in Germany than in market-based systems. 22 Another explanation is that American listed stock companies are indeed a bit more levered than are German listed stock companies, but mainly through the use of bond financing. The average growth of interest expense dI t /A t is higher for small firms than for big firms in both countries. A third interpretation of the differences in the leverage proxy is that I/A is simply not a good measure to use in international comparisons, because it is affected by national accounting definitions of interest expense as well as by varying interest rates. Despite these problems it remains a good variable to capture level and changes in the leverage policy of firms. 
Regression Results
Earnings and Dividends
In the simple regressions of Table 3 , the spread of value over cost has a strong positive effect on earnings (before and after taxes) and dividends, and negative slopes on the two-year change in value. 
Investment Decisions
What can be said on the effectiveness of investment decisions in Germany and the US?
Following the arguments of FF, on average, investment generates value in excess of cost in both countries, a statement that is not entirely supported by the German data.
The estimates of the regressions (1) and (2) 1967-84 (1985-91) . 26 For 1991, the ratio is 0.144 compared to 0.212 for the FF sample of American firms. When firms are value-weighted, the difference between both countries gets smaller but is still impressive. If these ratios are measures of "the effectiveness of resource allocation decisions of the publicly traded corporate sector of economies" 27 , then German firms fall far behind. This is especially true for high-BE/ME firms whose ratios of aggregate (V t -A t ) to aggregate A t are much lower than those of low-BE/ME firms, a pattern also to be observed in the US data. However, the fact that (V t -A t )/A t is higher for firms sorted into the low-BE/ME category is a tautology for both Germany and the US. The ratio BE/ME expanded with total 27 Fama and French (1996) p. 30. 28 This is due to the fact that there are no market values of liabilities on the Compustat tapes and we are only using book values as approximations. Therefore, we have V t /A t = (market value of debt + book value of liabilities) / total book assets, which is an expanded version of the ratio ME/BE. This is a general weakness of the FF approach. However, since BE/ME is used only as a sorting device for the descriptive statistics and not as an explanatory variable in the regressions, it does not corrupt the results. 29 FF note that under rational pricing and a perfect control for expected profits, the relation between investment and the spread of value over cost should be negative: holding profits fixed, an increase in assets implies a roughly one-for-one decline in the spread. Contrary though, the coefficients on dA t /A t and dA t+2 /A t in the full regressions are all positive and significantly different from -1.0. For the US, FF correctly infer that "the earnings and financing variables in the full regressions do not produce a perfect control for expected profits, and investment picks up some of the information they miss. "
Robust Statistical Methods
LS regressions --like the cross-section FM method --are sensitive to outliers in the data. Outliers are sample values which deviate from the majority of the sample, for example due to extreme observations or errors in the original data. This can be illustrated by introducing the concept of the breakdown value (bv) of an estimator, which is the proportion m/R of a sample S that can be moved to infinity without the estimator θ moving to infinity (Hampel, 1974) . It is formally given by bv(θ, S) = min {m/R such that b(m; θ, S) = ∞} where b(m; θ, S) is the maximum bias that can be obtained by replacing m of the R sample points by arbitrarily large outliers. The breakdown value is thus an indicator of the (in)sensitivity of an estimator to underlying assumptions about the distribution. For example, the breakdown value for the mean is 0%, i.e., the mean can be completely corrupted by one single outlier, whereas the breakdown value for the median is 50%.
The breakdown value of the LS estimator is given by bv(θ, S) = 1/R ≈ 0%. Thus, one single data point can cause the regression to break down. Venables and Ripley (1994) give several reasons why screening data and deleting outliers alone is ineffective in these cases:
• Even expert statisticians are not always able to screen the data.
• Down-weighting observations is preferable to completely rejecting them.
• It is very difficult to spot outliers in multivariate or highly structured data.
• Rejecting outliers conflicts with the underlying distribution theory by interfering with the iid requirement necessary for the sample selection process.
• If the outliers are leverage points, they cannot be uncovered by examining the residuals. 
Robust Fama-Macbeth Regressions
In a recent article Knez and Ready (1997) 
2 ) R are ordered squared residuals and a is a parameter vector of length p and q ≤ R. The scalar q over which the sum is taken depends on the trimmed portion α of the sample:
The highest possible breakdown value for the LTS estimator is given by ([(Rp)/2] +1)/R which is approximately 50%. It can be achieved by choosing α = 0.5
Trimming half of the sample is done to see if the previous LS regression results are confirmed under robust conditions. For this purpose, the LTSREG function in S-PLUS is used which returns a regression estimate by minimizing the sum of the smallest half of the squared residuals. It can only generate an approximation to the true solution based on a genetic algorithm, developed by Burns (1992) . 31 Hence, the regression results are not exactly reproducible, though the differences are negligible.
Nevertheless, they are supporting the results of the initial regressions.
Robust Regression Results
By trimming half of the sample one would intuitively expect dramatic differences between the simple LS and the LTS estimators, particularly, as a trade-off exists between trimming as many outliers as possible and maintaining a sufficient amount of 30 Knez and Ready (1997) point out that "[a] leverage point only has the potential to exert a large influence on the regression coefficients. For some observations, the x-values may be outliers in the x direction but, because of the associated y-values the observed points lie close to the regression line determined by the rest of the data." 31 The exact procedure is described in the S-PLUS User's Manual (Statistical Sciences, 1993) : "The objective that least trimmed squares minimizes is the sum of the q smallest squared residuals. Individual solutions are defined by a set of observation numbers, which corresponds to a least squares fit with the specified observations. A stock of popsize individuals is produced by random sampling, then a number of random samples are taken and the best solutions are saved in the stock. During the genetic phase, two parents are picked which produce an offspring that contains a sample of the observations from the parents. The best two out of the three are retained in the stock. 
Empirical Results and Theory
How well do these empirical results fit the theories of capital structure and dividend decisions? Fama/French (1996) and Harris/Raviv (1991) Fama and French (1996) p Masulis (1980 Masulis ( , 1983 , Cornett and Travlos (1989) e Myers and Majluf (1984) , Miller and Rock (1985) k Kim and Stulz (1988) q Ross (1977) f Miller and Modigliani (1963) , Scholes (1978) l Grossman and Hart (1982) , Harris and Raviv (1990) 
h Fama and French (1996) sample of 32 German firms.
d
The author i As it is evidenced by many event-studies, e.g., Charest (1978 ), m Ross (1977 , Bhattacharya (1979) e Myers (1984) Aharony and Swary (1980) , Asquith and Mullins (1983) . 
Conclusion
In 1991, a dollar of assets invested in a public stock company in the United States generated $1.21 in value whereas a deutschmark invested in German stock companies generated only DM 1.14 on average. This discrepancy widens if we take into account that only industrial and commercial firms but no banks or insurance companies are found in the Global Vantage I/C File. When FF drop these "competitive service industries" from their sample, their average value added per dollar rises.
The question is whether this is an operational benchmark for the effectiveness of investment decisions either country. Yes and no. One interpretation of small spreads of value over cost is that economic activity in a country is highly competitive. It is highly doubtful that this is a reasonable explanation for the differences in the spreads between the two countries. One problem with using my results and those by FF to compare firm behavior in the two countries is that the respective sample sizes differ.
There are far more firms in the FF sample than in the sample of German firms.
Nonetheless, the evidence of the effects of earnings, dividends, and investment on firm value shows parallel patterns in both countries, a phenomenon that cannot be explained solely by data snooping. LTS regressions according to the "robust" Fama-MacBeth procedure by Knez and Ready (1997) do not seem not to affect qualitative results,
either. Yet, the value added of the German economy as a whole is unlikely to be that inferior to that of the US economy. I will provide two interpretations that might throw some light on this issue.
First, the market value of shares of domestic companies as a percentage of GDP is only 20.3% in Germany compared to 77.3% in the US (Allen and Gale, 1994) .
Therefore, most of the investment activity that is going on in Germany is not reflected in the stock market, a phenomenon portrayed by the smaller size of the sample of German stock companies. Hence, the current study covers only a small part of the German economy, while FF is likely to capture most of the corporate activity in the US. Thus, the German sample is heavily biased towards big publicly quoted companies. The renownedly successful German small and middle-sized companies which are likely to produce most of the value added in the economy are not included in the sample. This privacy of a lot of corporate activity is also a very own characteristic of the German financial system. Secondly, "maximizing shareholder value" has not always been the main objective for corporations in Germany. Traditionally, social consensus between stakeholders has been a guideline of corporate governance in Germany. For example, between one third and one half of the directors of the supervisory board in German companies are appointed by the employees. This ensures that a good part of the value added is not distributed to shareholders but rather to company employees, in the form of wages, social benefits, and job security. This share of the value added is not reflected in a company's stock price. However, at the margin investment decisions in Germany seem to generate less value. It can be argued if this is due to the corporate governance system or to other factors, such as capital productivity. As we have seen, even with an identical empirical methodology, it is difficult to make reliable comparative statements on investment, earnings and dividend patterns prevalent in the two countries. There is a lot of research left for the future. 
2.27
The regressions are run for each year t using all German firms with data available for the year on all variables in the level regressions. The table shows 
